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1Autonomic Parameter Tuning of Anomaly-Based
IDSs: an SSH Case Study
Anna Sperotto, Michel Mandjes, Ramin Sadre, Pieter-Tjerk de Boer, and Aiko Pras
Abstract—Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems classify
network traffic instances by comparing them with a model of
the normal network behavior. To be effective, such systems are
expected to precisely detect intrusions (high true positive rate)
while limiting the number of false alarms (low false positive
rate). However, there exists a natural trade-off between detecting
all anomalies (at the expense of raising alarms too often),
and missing anomalies (but not issuing any false alarms). The
parameters of a detection system play a central role in this trade-
off, since they determine how responsive the system is to an
intrusion attempt. Despite the importance of properly tuning the
system parameters, the literature has put little emphasis on the
topic, and the task of adjusting such parameters is usually left
to the expertise of the system manager or expert IT personnel.
In this paper, we present an autonomic approach for tuning the
parameters of anomaly-based intrusion detection systems in case
of SSH traffic. We propose a procedure that aims to automatically
tune the system parameters and, by doing so, to optimize the
system performance. We validate our approach by testing it on
a flow-based probabilistic detection system for the detection of
SSH attacks.
Index Terms—Autonomic, Network Management, Anomalies,
Intrusion Detection, Parameter Optimization
I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs) aim to
classify an activity as benign (normal) or malicious (anoma-
lous) by comparing it with a model of normality. Since
the Eighties, many flavors of anomaly-based systems have
been developed, depending both on the type of information
processed (network traffic or system logs, for example) as
well as the type of modeling technique used (among others:
statistical or machine learning techniques) [1]. In all cases,
however, an anomaly detection system can be more or less
sensitive to a change in normality. The sensitivity of a system
to anomalies controls which instances of traffic are flagged
as anomalous and, in general, it determines the performance
of the system. The sensitivity level of an anomaly detection
system usually depends on a set of system parameters. Such
parameters play a central role, since they determine the overall
behavior of the detection system and how it reacts to an
intrusion.
If the parameters are chosen such that the system recognizes
as benign only activities that closely match the normality
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model and rejects as suspicious all the others, it is likely that
all malicious activities will be reported. However, at the same
time, alerts will erroneously be raised also for a high number
of benign activities. Similarly, if the system is more permissive
with respect to the normality models, it will raise fewer alerts,
but it is likely that it will miss some malicious attempts. As
we can see, there exists a natural trade-off between detecting
all anomalies (at the expense of raising alarms too often), and
missing anomalies (but not issuing any false alarms). Such a
trade-off is governed by the system parameters. In Figure 1 we
have sketched how such a trade-off might look like. The figure
provides a visual representation of the fact that the number of
missed anomalies and the number of false alarms are inter-
related measures. Evidently, the precise shape of the curves
depends on the case at hand.
Fig. 1: Trade-off between missed anomalies and false alarms
Despite the deep impact that the system parameters have on
the performance of the detection system, the literature has put
little emphasis on the topic of autonomic parameter tuning
for intrusion detection systems [2]. The task of tuning the
system is carried on by the system manager or by expert
IT personnel and it requires detailed knowledge of both the
detection system as well as the network to be protected. While
tuning a system, the system manager implicitly aims to achieve
the best compromise, or optimal solution, that is keeping the
false positives as low as possible while trying to detect as
many real attacks as possible.
In this paper, we propose an autonomic approach for the
tuning of intrusion detection systems in the case of SSH dic-
tionary attacks. Our approach allows the system performance
to be optimized with respect to the aforementioned trade-off.
The goal is to allow the system manager to control the system
performance by specifying high-level policies. Our approach
classifies as autonomic, as it allows the IDS to embed self-
2optimizing operations that rely on an appropriate parameter
tuning process. It is the primary objective of our paper to
show that, in the SSH setting we consider, such a parameter
tuning process can be developed.
The proposed approach can be generalized with respect to
the type of anomaly detection system under consideration,
as we will discuss in Section VIII. However, in the context
of this paper, we focus on a system based on the following
assumptions. First, in modern networks we are observing a
continuous increase in line speed and load, and throughput of
several Gbps is not uncommon anymore. Aggregated network
measures, such as network flows, became recently an appealing
approach to intrusion detection since they help in coping
with scalability issues [3], [4]. The data our system analyzes
are network flows (NetFlow/IPFIX), that in this context are
defined as “a set of IP packets passing an observation point in
the network during a certain time interval and having a set of
common properties” [5]. Flows also constitute a challenge for
intrusion detection systems, since they reduce the amount of
information available for analysis. To overcome this problem,
we focus on time series derived from flow information, i.e., the
time series of the number of flows active on the network at the
time of the measurement. Flow time series reveal trends in the
traffic that can be exploited for detection [2], [6]. In this paper,
we focus on SSH (Secure Shell) traffic. Our previous studies
showed that the SSH service is a regular target of attacks
[7], allowing us to collect relevant data sets of malicious and
normal traffic. Finally, we apply our approach to a simple
detection system, based on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs).
This paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related
work in Section II. As introduction to our approach, we
first present, in general terms, the intrusion detection system
we want to optimize in Section III, the type of attack we
aim to detect in Section IV, and the performance measures
used to validate our findings in Section V. Our optimization
procedure, that we present in Section VI, is supported by an
extensive validation, presented in Section VII. We then discuss
possible extensions of the proposed optimization procedure in
Section VIII. Finally, Section IX summaries our findings.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide pointers to related work in the
fields of interest linked to this paper. The main conclusion
of our brief summary is that until now autonomic tuning
procedures received limited attention. We consider this a
crucial difference between our work and the existing literature.
As pointed out in Section I, only a few contributions address
the topic of parameter tuning for anomaly detection. In [8],
the authors explicitly analyze the variation in performance
of anomaly-based systems when the system parameters vary,
but they do not attempt to automatically tune them. In [9],
the authors present a feedback system based on fuzzy logic
to control the number of alerts that should be raised to
the system operator. Differently from our contribution, this
approach relies on the human operator to provide instance-
by-instance feedback, in place of specifying policies. The
works in [10] and [11] have a different focus compared to
our contribution, since they study the dynamical aspects of an
intrusion detection system, that is how to adapt the system
behavior when a change in normality occurs.
On a methodological level, a substantial body of work
focuses on the detection of anomalies in communication
networks. Several early papers consider similar issues; without
aiming to give an exhaustive overview, we refer to [12], [13],
[14]. For the case of Voice-over-IP, guidelines can be found
in e.g., [15], but these are of an empirical nature. The main
contribution of [16] is developing procedures for anomaly
detection that are backed by a mathematical justification.
An application of the celebrated Cumulative Sum (CUSUM)
technique [17] in the networking domain can be found in [18]
and [19]. Several valuable contributions to the changepoint
detection problem are due to Tartakovsky and co-authors [20].
It should be noted that there is also a vast literature on
statistical techniques for data analysis in networking, from
which our work on HMMs originated, as for example in the
case of the traffic-classification problem [21], [22], [23], [24],
[25]. HMMs are an effective tool to model sequential data [26].
Since they have been introduced in the early 1970s [27], they
have been successfully applied to different scientific fields,
for instance speech recognition [28], pattern recognition [29]
and keystrokes analysis [30]. A few important references on
HMMs in the networking context are [31], [22]. However,
these papers focus on procedures at packet-level, while our
work targets flow-based time series. HMMs are particularly
attractive in the context of intrusion detection, as they allow
easy computation of the likelihood of a given sequence of
events. Behavioral models for host-based intrusion detection
have been proposed in [32] and [33]. The authors profile the
normal sequence of system calls and raise alarms whenever a
sequence is ‘sufficiently unlikely’. Contrary to these contribu-
tions, we model normal activities based on network data.
This paper focuses on the detection of anomalous SSH
traffic, in particular the very common and well-known SSH
dictionary attack [34], [35]. Although these attacks have been
active for quite some time now, they can still be potentially
dangerous. Our study [36] showed that newly set up vulnerable
hosts can be compromised within a few days and be used
as platform for the same attacks. We also showed that SSH
attacks are visible at flow level (as peaks in the SSH flow time
series) [37].
III. DETECTION SYSTEM PRINCIPLES
The general assumption underlying network anomaly detec-
tion is that malicious activities (statistically) deviate from the
network’s normal behavior [38]. In this section, we present in
general terms an anomaly-based system that builds upon the
techniques developed in [7]. We then point out the challenges
faced when aiming to automatically tune and optimize the
system parameters.
Figure 2 presents a high-level overview of the proposed
detection system. We assume the system to be based on
a probabilistic model of normal behavior, indicated by λ.
The system observes a stream of network measurements
{o1, o2, . . .} and analyzes a window (of length w ∈ N) of past
3measurements, to which we refer as observation sequence.
Observation sequences have been introduced because time
series aggregate information and, therefore, in many cases a
single time bin is not indicative of the presence of an attack. At
time t ∈ N, our detection procedure evaluates the likelihood
of observing the sequence Owt = {ot−w+1, . . . , ot}, with
respect to our base model λ; we denote this likelihood by
Φ(Owt |λ). Informally, the value Φ(Owt |λ) is an indication
of how likely it is to observe Owt according to what we
consider normality. Evidently, unlikely sequences will yield
relatively low likelihoods, legitimate sequences relatively high
likelihoods. The system will then apply a threshold θ to the
likelihood value Φ(Owt |λ) to detect unlikely events.
The challenge is to discriminate between likely and unlikely
observation sequences by varying the system parameters w and
θ, while at the same time keeping a low classification errors.
Fig. 2: Detection system.
The selection of the parameters θ and w does play a
crucial role in the effectiveness of the detection system. If
θ is too low, it is likely that the system would be prone to
raise false alerts (false positives, in the sequel denoted by
FP), by raising alerts also in case of legitimate observation
sequences; if θ is too high, on the other hand, the rate of alerts
being generated would decrease, but the system would become
less reactive to malicious activities (false negatives; FN). The
impact of w is usually model-dependent. Small values of w
are likely to prompt the model to give more importance to
single observations, possibly causing “too quick” false alerts
(FP). Larger values of w may, on the other hand, mitigate the
effect of possible unlikely events in the observation sequence,
with the risk of missing anomalies (FN).
The values of θ and w define therefore interesting trade-offs
that determine the performance of the detection system. Our
goal is to present a systematic framework yielding optimal
values for the parameters θ and w. It should be realized,
though, that this selection mainly depends on the specific goals
pursued in the situation at hand: is the primary objective to
allow false alerts but to be sure to flag all the anomalies, or vice
versa, or perhaps some intermediate scenario? The selection
procedure that we propose in the following explicitly takes
into account this preference.
IV. SSH CASE STUDY
In the following sections, we will illustrate the performance
of the proposed detection system by means of a case study:
the detection of SSH dictionary attacks in SSH normal traffic.
As indicated before, we should first define a base model
λ describing the normal behavior. Note that, in our case, we
consider as normal all the traffic that was not generated by an
SSH dictionary attack, the attack on which we concentrate our
Fig. 3: Normal SSH traffic model.
attention. This means that the base model λ can also include
malicious traffic patterns due to attacks different from the
SSH dictionary attack, since these attacks are not of interests
for this specific demo IDS. For the implementation of our
system, we defined the base model λ as an HMM. HMMs are
particularly suitable for time-series anomaly detection because
they allow a compact representation of the studied system,
in this case network traffic, while encoding its evolution in
time. Moreover, HMMs offer efficient ways of calculating
the probability that a specific sequence of observations would
occur (see App. A).
In Figure 3, we present the Discrete-Time Markov Chain
(DTMC) for the HMM describing the normal SSH traffic, with
an example of initial and transition probabilities. The model
was developed and validated in [2]. The DTMC consists of
two states: a state A, in which there is SSH traffic on the
network (activity), and a state I , in which there is no SSH
traffic (inactivity). The model parameters, as for example the
initial and transition probabilities in Figure 3, are estimated by
training the model on traces of legitimate SSH traffic collected
on the University of Twente (UT) network (see Section VII-A).
We let the starting distribution pi = [piA,piI ] be equal to the
DTMC’s steady state distribution. Each state is augmented
with an output probability distribution that in this case is the
empirical distribution function of flows per second. Empirical
distributions of packets per second and bytes per seconds are
also possible. However, flows per second is the discriminating
measure between malicious and benign activities for SSH
dictionary attack, therefore we concentrate on that distribution.
We indicate with Owt = {ot−w+1, . . . , ot} the observation
sequence in the time-frame t − w + 1, . . . , t in our training
set. Note that, according to such definition, each observation
sequence in the training set is unique, independently from the
values oi that constitute it. In the HMM framework, we refer
to the probability of an observation sequence Owt as:
Φ(Owt |λ) =
∑
∀Q
piqt−w+1bqt−w+1(ot−w+1) ·
·
t∏
i=t−w+2
aqi−1qibqi(oi),
where piqt−w+1 ∈ {piA,piI}, depending if the first slot of the
observation sequence shows SSH traffic or not, and where we
assume that the observation sequence Owt could have been
generated by several state sequences Q = {qt−w+1, . . . , qt}.
We indicate, with aqjqi the transition probability from state qj
to state qi, and with bqi(oi) the output probability of symbol
oi in state qi. Since Φ(Owt |λ) tends to be small when w grows,
4it is more convenient to work with
$wt := − logΦ(Owt |λ), (1)
where the minus sign allows us to work in R+.
Since the HMM in Figure 3 is trained on benign SSH traffic,
the model is supposed to assign relatively high (low) $wt values
to sequences of malicious (legitimate) traffic. Figure 4(a)
shows the time series of flows per second for an SSH traffic
trace measured at the UT on July 16, 2008. Between 7:00
and 7:40, the university network has been the target of an
SSH dictionary attack. For the detail of that type of attack,
we refer to [7]. In Figure 4(b) we present an example of how
$wt raises in case of network anomalies, based on the data of
Figure 4(a), taking w = 100 sec. The window of observations
slides over the time series with a step size of 1 second. Such
a step size has been chosen since our experiments showed
that a 1-second resolution led to a good compromise between
data granularity and the risk of observing artifacts due to data
aggregation. Figure 4(b) shows that $wt attains values roughly
between 200 and 400 during the normal phases, whereas
during the attack the value of $wt abruptly raises to 1000. This
graph suggests that $wt is a suitable measure for discriminating
between normal and anomalous traffic. However, we observe
that also other observation sequences provoke a raise of $wt ,
for example around 10 AM, 4 PM, and 10 PM. In these cases,
applying a threshold θ of 500, a network anomaly would have
been reported even though there was no indication of malicious
activity; θ = 800 would be a more appropriate choice here.
This underlines that a procedure to soundly select θ is of
crucial importance.
V. ATTACKS, OBSERVATIONS AND DETECTION
In this section, we will define the performance measures we
will later use to evaluate and optimize our prototype detection
system. In Section V-A, we describe our system in terms of a
binary classifier. This characterization allows us to define the
performance metrics we are interested in in Section V-B.
A. Binary classifier
A detection system is traditionally regarded as a binary
classifier [39]. A binary classifier analyzes a set I of instances
of a problem and maps these to two prediction classes. The
prediction classes in the case of intrusion detection are usually
indicated as:
• P , or positive: P ⊆ I , such that i ∈ P if i has been
labeled as an attack;
• N , or negative: N ⊆ I , such that i ∈ N if i has been
labeled as legitimate.
We assume P ∩N = ∅ and P ∪N = I . The performance of
a classifier is evaluated based on how precise the prediction
classes are compared to the actual classes of the instances (the
ground truth). We indicate the actual classes as:
• M , or malicious: M ⊆ I , such that i ∈ M if i is an
attack;
• B, or benign: B ⊆ I , such that i ∈ B if i is legitimate.
Also in this case we assume M ∩B = ∅ and M ∪B = I .
As described in Section III, we propose an intrusion detec-
tion system based on a window of past observations Owt . This
approach implies that Owt is the traffic instance that we aim
to classify. We therefore define B, M , P and N as sets of
observations sequences.
Given an observation sequence Owt = {ot−w+1, . . . , ot}t,
each observation oi can be either malicious, if an attacker was
active at time i, or benign, if no attacker was active at time
i. Each observation sequence can therefore contain several
malicious observations. Due to the sliding window mechanism,
the malicious observation will be added on the right side of
the observation sequence and leave the observation sequence
on the left side. Since we want to detect an attack as early as
possible, we define an attack to begin when the first malicious
observation appears in the rightmost (youngest) position in
the observation sequence; similarly, an attack ends when a
benign observation appears in the rightmost position in the
observation sequence. In the following, we will define the sets
B, M , P and N for the case under consideration. Please note
that such sets will now depend on the observation sequence
length w. We therefore stress this dependency by introducing
the superscript Bw, Mw, Pw and Nw. Following the reason-
ing introduced above, we derive the following definitions:
Mw = {Owt | ot is malicious}, (2)
Bw = {Owt | ot is benign}. (3)
With this definition of Mw and Bw, it is important to
note that the discriminating condition between malicious and
benign observation sequences is given by the youngest obser-
vation. The consequence of this is that an observation sequence
will be considered malicious (benign) even if all but the last
observation are benign (malicious). This reflects the situation
in which an observation sequence is labeled as malicious
as soon as an attack becomes active (i.e., it appears in the
youngest slot of an observation sequence). Similarly, once an
attack is over, the youngest slot of an observation sequence
is benign and we consider the entire observation sequence
as benign. In other words, we can say that our definitions
focus on the classification of the current situation, and use the
history for supporting the classification. Note, however, that
other definitions of Mw and Bw are possible.
Finally, the prediction classes are such that an observation
sequence is flagged as positive if it deviates from the base
model of traffic λ. We therefore define:
Pw = {Owt | $wt > θ}, (4)
Nw = {Owt | $wt ≤ θ}. (5)
B. Performance measures
This section introduces the performance measures of interest
for our study. We propose three groups of performance metrics.
The first two, the confusion matrix and the detection rate are
traditionally used in evaluating IDSs [40]. The third group,
the detection and normalization lags, has been introduced in
this paper to quantify the delays the detection system incurs
in detecting an attack and in recognizing the re-establishment
of a normal situation.
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Fig. 4: Time series for a day of SSH traffic (flows/second) (a) and log-likelihood of the time series (b).
1) Confusion matrix: The confusion matrix [39] describes
both the corrected classified instances and the errors between
the classes. Based on the confusion matrix, the following
performance metrics can be defined:
• the true positive TP = #{P ∩M}; and the false negative
FN = #{N ∩M};
• the true negative TN = #{N ∩B}; and the false positive
FP = #{P ∩B}.
The measures above are often expressed in terms of rates, that
is TP-rate = TP/#{M}, FP-rate = FP/#{B}, and so on. In
the sequel, we will use the notation TN, TP, FN, FP as rates,
such that TN + FP = TP + FN = 1.
2) Detection rate: Traditionally, intrusion detection evalu-
ates the system performance in terms of TN, TP, FN, FP, based
on the sets M , B, P and N . In our case, the elements of
such sets are observation sequences Owt . However, it should
be noted that an attack could cover more than one observation
sequence. We define an attack A to be detected if at least one
observation sequence part of the attack is flagged as positive.
Formally, A is detected if there exists at least one observation
sequence Owt , ts ≤ t ≤ te such that Owt ∈ P ∩M , where
ts and te indicate the starting and ending time of an attack,
respectively.
Besides the rate of correctly classified observation se-
quences, we can therefore also measure, for a set of attacks
in our data sets, how many attacks have been detected. We
define this performance measure as the detection rate DR per
attack:
DR =
#{detected attacks}
#{attacks} .
3) Detection and normalization lags: A detection system
aims to identify the presence of an attack. A likely situation is
that classification errors would be observed at the beginning
and at the end of the attack. While the traffic is entering the
observation window, some observation sequences will be clas-
sified as negative, since only few observations are malicious.
Conversely, while the window is leaving the attack, some
observation sequences will be flagged as positive, since only
their youngest observations are benign. It is highly preferable
that an attack is detected fast. Similarly, it is desirable for a
detection system to also recognize as fast as possible that an
anomalous situation is over.
Since in our setup we rely on a sliding window mechanism
with steps of 1 second, we can measure how promptly the
system reacts by analyzing the classification errors at the
beginning and at the end of an attack. It is therefore desirable
to have a low rate of false negatives in the beginning of an
attack and a low rate of false positives when an attack is over.
Given an attack A, and its starting and ending time, ts and
te, we then define the following measures:
• the detection lag, i.e., the delay, in our case measured in
seconds, before an attack is detected:
DwA := min{t ≥ ts| Owt ∈M ∩ P}− ts;
• the normalization lag, i.e., the delay, in seconds, in
recognizing that an attack is over. Since we aim to
investigate the impact of the history on the analysis of
normal traffic, we measure the normalization lag within
w observations from the end of the attack:
EwA := min{te ≤ t < te + w| Owt ∈ B ∩N}− te.
Finally, we can calculate the averages, Dw
A
and Ew
A
, over
the attacks present in our data sets, of the detection and
normalization lags.
VI. THE OPTIMIZATION PROCEDURE
In Section I, we argued that tuning an IDS entails searching
for an optimal solution w.r.t. the trade-off between detect-
ing as many attack as possible and having a low rate of
false alarms. More generally, let us consider an IDS with
parameters p1, . . . , pn and a high-level policy P describing the
required behavior of the IDS in terms of some performance
metrics M1, . . . ,Mm, such as for example TP and TN. To
automatically tune the system parameters to satisfy P , the
following steps should be taken. First, it is necessary to define
a mathematical relation Goal of the performance metric that
we aim to optimize, that keeps into account the policy P:
maximize
p1,...,pn
Goal(M1, . . . ,Mm,P).
6TABLE I: The optimization procedure.
Optimization procedure
Inputs:
IDS parameters θ, w
Performance metrics TN, TP
Policy (α,β)
step 1:
maximize
θ,w
α · TN + β · TP
step 2: relation between TN, TP and θ:
TN = P(Xw ≤ θ), TP = 1− P(Y w ≤ θ)
Xw, Y w
d
= Gm(p,µ,σ)
step 3: solve Problem (6)
This relation describes the goal, such as for example max-
imizing the correct classification. However, in the present
formulation, the optimization problem requires that we are
able to measure the performance metrics M1, . . . ,Mm for
varying parameters. This operation can be computationally
intensive. To reduce the complexity of this step, we propose
an intermediate step where we analytically express the relation
between the performance measures and the system parameters.
Once we have expressed a mathematical relation between
performance measures and the system parameters, the last step
is to analytically solve the optimization problem. Table I shows
how the aforementioned steps have been implemented in the
context of this paper.
A. The optimization problem
This section focuses on formalizing the parameter tuning as
an optimization problem (step 1 of the procedure in Table I).
Our aim is to determine suitable values for the parameters w
and θ.
The performance of an IDS is usually presented by means of
a so-called Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) [39]. The
ROC curve plots the combinations of FP and TP, by varying θ.
ROC curves are a technique for visualizing the performances
of a classifier, since they show the “relative trade-offs between
benefits (TP) and costs (FP)” [39]. Intuitively, the steeper
the ROC curve grows, the better is the performance of the
classifier.
Figure 5 shows examples of ROC curves obtained by testing
the HMM-based detection system on a synthetic data set of
SSH traffic for different window sizes. As mentioned above,
each point on the ROC curves is determined by a different
value of the threshold θ. The curves show a steep growth
of TP for low values of FP, while the curves grow slower for
higher values of FP. The ROC curves indicate that the proposed
detection system is able to discriminate between malicious
and benign observation sequences with high TP and low FP.
However, Figure 5 also shows that:
• The ROC curves growth depends on the observation
sequence length w; we plotted curves for three values w.
They indicate that the performance of the procedure can
be improved by choosing w optimally. For instance, as
shown in the subplot of Figure 5, to obtain TP = 0.98,
w = 100 would provide the lowest FP. Moreover, the
optimal value of w will change with the desired TP and
FP.
• Since θ controls in which point of a ROC curve we
operate, the choice of the threshold value θ depends on
the desired performance. For example, for w = 100 we
can obtain TP = 0.8 with FP = 0.02, but also TP = 0.93
with FP = 0.1.
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Fig. 5: Receiver Operating Characteristics, for varying window size.
The above reasoning indicates that one can optimize the
parameters w and θ, and the optimum critically depends on
the relative importance the system manager assigns to TP and
FP. Making use of the relation TN = 1− FP, we formulate the
optimization problem as follows:
maximize
θ,w
α · TN + β · TP. (6)
Here the parameters α and β embody the relative impor-
tance the system manager assigns to TN and TP. If he chooses
α substantially larger than β, the optimization would lead to
values of (w, θ) that make the system behave conservatively,
flagging anomalies only if there are strong evidences of an
attack, at the expense of relatively many false negatives. On
the other hand, if he picks α considerably smaller than β
the system would become more aware of malicious traffic,
favoring in this way TP, but by increasing FP.
B. Probabilistic interpretation of the classification problem
We concentrate now on formalizing the relation between
the system parameters and the performance metrics (step 2
of the procedure in Table I). We define the following random
variables: for an arbitrary observation sequence of length w,
Xw := − logΦ(Owt |λ) for Owt ∈ Bw
for a benign observation sequence, and
Y w := − logΦ(Owt |λ) for Owt ∈Mw
for a malicious observation sequence. For any given w, we can
estimate the density functions fwX(·) and fwY (·) in the form of
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normalized frequency histograms obtained from training data.
An example of these are shown in Figure 6 for w = 100, based
on the analysis of normal and malicious traffic. In the figure
we also show an example value for θ, which splits the sample
space in regions. The subspace to the left of the threshold
corresponds to negatively-flagged inputs; in the same way, the
subspace to the right of the threshold corresponds to positively-
flagged inputs. The intersection between such subspaces and
the probability distributions results in regions that we can map
directly on the confusion matrix of our binary classifier. In
particular, according to this formulation, we have
TN = P(Xw ≤ θ), FP = 1− P(Xw ≤ θ), (7)
FN = P(Y w ≤ θ), TP = 1− P(Y w ≤ θ). (8)
We can now rewrite Problem (6) as follows:
maximize
θ,w
α · P(Xw ≤ θ) + β · (1− P(Y w ≤ θ)). (9)
Figure 6 also shows that the distributions of Xw and Y w
overlap, and hence θ cannot be chosen such that it perfectly
discriminates between malicious and benign. The presence of
an overlapping region, and its size, can change from data set
to data set, and this imposes a sort of theoretical limit to the
classification performance of the detection procedure for given
λ and w.
In (9), TN and TP are expressed in terms of the cumula-
tive distribution functions of Xw and Y w. These cumulative
distribution functions can be determined empirically, in the
same way as we did for the densities in Figure 6. However,
since our goal is to perform the optimization in (9), which is
over θ and w, we need the distribution functions P(Xw ≤ ·)
and P(Y w ≤ ·) for a broad range of values of w. Evidently,
estimating these for many and especially for large values of w
will make the optimization procedure slow: the complexity of
computing $wt is linear in w, and such measure is computed
for each observation sequence, i.e., each time the window
slides over the time series. Therefore, especially for a large
amount of training data, such a procedure is costly. To reduce
the complexity, we proceed as described in the following.
Our analysis of the empirical density function for Xw and
Y w for variable values of w shows that a Gaussian mixture
distribution (denoted by Gm) offers a suitable fit for the con-
sidered distributions. Following the convention to write vectors
in bold, we say that a random variable Z is Gm(p,µ,σ) of
order n ∈ N, with pi ≥ 0 adding up to 1, if its probability
density function is in the form
fZ(x) =
n∑
i=1
pifNi(x),
where the components Ni = N (µi,σi), for i = 1, . . . , n,
are independent normally distributed random variables. To add
flexibility and decrease the cost of estimating the Gaussian
parameter for arbitrary values of w, we follow the next steps:
1) for a small set of window sizes w = w1, . . . , wn, we fit
Gaussian mixtures to the empirical distribution densities
fwX and fwY ; we obtain the set of Gaussian mixture
parameters pwX ,µwX and σwX and pwY ,µwY and σwY ;
2) we express the fitted Gaussian parameters as explicit
functions of w:
piXw = g1(w), µiXw = g2(w), and σiXw = g3(w),
where for example gi can be a fitted polynomial function;
3) finally, we apply the explicit functions gi to extrapolate
the parameters values for arbitrary values of w.
Figure 7 shows examples of polynomial fits for the Gaussian
parameters of data set Synthetic 2.
To conclude our procedure, step 3 can be completed by
optimizing (9). Since the empirical density function for Xw
and Y w are fitted with Gaussian mixture distributions, (9) can
also be rewritten as the sum of the cumulative distribution
functions of the Gaussian component, i.e., as a sum of cumula-
tive distribution functions of normal distributions. We indicate
the cumulative distribution function of Ni(µi,σi) with
F (θ, µ,σ) =
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ θ
−∞
e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2dx. (10)
Then, (9) can be rewritten as
maximize
θ,w
α ·
n∑
i=1
piXwF (θ, µiXw ,σiXw)
+ β · (1−
m∑
i=1
piY wF (θ, µiY w ,σiY w)),
(11)
where n and m are the number of Gaussian components
for Xw and Y w, respectively, piXw , µiXw and σiXw the
parameters of the Gaussian Mixture for Xw, and piY w , µiY w
and σiY w the parameters of the Gaussian Mixture for Y w.
However, the integral in (10) has no analytical solution.
Therefore, (11) has to be numerically solved, for example
by identifying the zeros of the derivative of the function in
Eq. (11).
VII. VALIDATION AND EXPERIMENTATION
The aim of this section is twofold. First we present the
data sets used for testing in Section VII-A, and we describe
the impact of the analytical procedure compared to results
obtained with empirical data in Section VII-B. Then, we show
how varying α and β affects the performance of the system
(Section VII-C).
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Fig. 7: Polynomial fits for the Gaussian Mixture parameters for the data set Synthetic 2
A. Data sets
We tested our procedure using six data sets of SSH time
series of flows per seconds, each containing both legitimate
and malicious traffic. Two data sets, Synthetic 1 and Synthetic
2, are synthetically generated as described in [7], [2]. The
other four data sets, Original 1, Original 2, Set 1 and Set 2
consist instead of time series created directly from real traffic
collected at the UT network.
The synthetic data sets Synthetic 1 and Synthetic 2 consist
of 20 time series of 5400 seconds (time slots) each, each
one of them containing one attack. The data sets Original
1 and Original 2 have been created from traces captured on
17-20 July 2008 and 23-26 April 2009, respectively. Data
set Original 1 contains 7 attacks, while data set Original 2
contains 6 attacks. Attacks have been identified based on the
reports of a quarantine system deployed at UT, and have been
manually labeled. Finally, Set 1 and Set 2 have been captured
at the UT network on 13-16 April 2008 and 19-22 July 2009,
respectively, and they have been manually labeled with the
same procedure used for Original 1 and Original 2.
In the following, we used Set 1 and Set 2 for the training
of the HMM λ, while the other data sets have been used for
testing. Figure 3 shows the initial and transition probabilities
obtained by training the model on Set 1. The HMM λ has
been trained on Set 1 for testing Synthetic 1 and Original 1,
and on Set 2 for testing Synthetic 2 and Original 2.
In Section VI, we proposed Gaussian Mixture distributions
as suitable fits for the empirical density functions Xw and Y w.
However, the number of components of the Gaussian mixtures
can be data set specific. In our setup, we observed that:
• n = 2 yields an excellent fit for the data sets Synthetic 1
and Synthetic 2. We therefore define:
Xw
d
= Gm(pwB ,µ
w
B ,σ
w
B)
and
Y w
d
= Gm(pwM ,µ
w
M ,σ
w
M );
• for the data sets Original 1 and Original 2, we choose
n = 1 for Xw and n = 2 for Y w:
Xw
d
= N (µwB ,σwB)
and
Y w
d
= Gm(pwM ,µ
w
M ,σ
w
M ).
Figure 8 presents an example of the fits for the benign and
malicious distributions in Synthetic 2, obtained for w = 300.
Finally, the relation between the Gm parameters pw, µw and
σw and the window size w, for both the benign and malicious
distributions, has been expressed by means of polynomial fits.
Our findings show that µw is a linear function of w, σw can
be approximated by a polynomial of degree 3 and pw by a
polynomial of degree 2 (see Figure 7).
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B. Optimization procedure validation
In Section VI, we proposed an optimization procedure
built upon Gaussian Mixture distributions. In this section, we
validate such a procedure, by measuring how precisely we
can approximate the empirical optimal results. We therefore
compare the results of the optimization problem (i) calculated
on empirical data and (ii) analytically calculated by means
of Gaussian fits. For this test, we set α = β = 1. The
empirical data are obtained by directly measuring TN and TP
on the empirical distribution of $wt , similar to the one shown
in Figure 6.
Figures 9(a), 9(b) and 9(c) present the relative errors be-
tween the empirical and analytical values for the performance
measures TP and TN and the threshold θ, for the data sets
Synthetic 1, Synthetic 2, Original 1 and Original 2. The figures
show the relative error between the empirical values and the
9values obtained through our procedure by means of Gaussian
fits, expressed in %.
The results in Figures 9(a), 9(b) and 9(c) show that the
approach, based on fitted Gm distributions, very well approx-
imates the results one would have found using the empirical
distributions. For the data set Synthetic 1, the relative error for
TN, TP and θ is for all the considered cases lower than 5%,
and such error is lower than 4% for Synthetic 2. For Original
1 we see that the relative error is generally lower or close
to 10%. For the data set Original 2, on the other hand, we
observe a higher error in TP and TN, in certain cases up to
32% for TN. We identify the cause for such higher errors in
the polynomial fits used to approximate the parameters of Xw
and Y w as functions of w. In this case, the polynomial fitting
does not yield to the same excellent fits as for the other data
sets [2]. The error in approximating θ remains, however, in
any case lower than 6%.
Our findings confirm that the Gaussian mixtures are a
suitable fit for the malicious and benign $wt distributions and
they can be used to compute the optimal parameter θ.
C. Performance measures
The aim of this section is to study the impact of the
parameters α and β on the performance of our simple detection
system. We therefore report here the performance measure
for varying ratio β/α. Note that it is not needed to know
the absolute values of α and β, as only their ratio affects
the outcome of the optimization procedure. As explained in
Section V-B, the performance is expressed in terms of: (i) the
confusion matrix and (ii) the detection rate, as commonly done
in intrusion detection; (iii) the detection and normalization lags
in recognizing the presence of an attack or the re-establishment
of a normal situation.
1) Confusion matrix: Tables II, III, IV and V present the
confusion matrix and the detection and normalization lags, as
achieved by the system for the data sets Synthetic 1, Synthetic
2, Original 1 and Original 2, respectively. The rows in the
tables are obtained as follows. First, for a given β/α, we
compute the optimal w and θ, based on the learned HMM
λ and the Gaussian fits for the considered data set. Then
the data set is analyzed by calculating the test statistic $wt
for each observation sequence. An observation sequence is
then classified as positive or negative. Finally, TP and TN are
calculated. Note that the tables also include results for the
detection and normalization lags. We will discuss such results
later in this section. We first focus on the effect of varying
α/β on the metrics TP and TN. Considering the results:
• we observe that the optimal choice of the design pa-
rameters w and θ is data set specific. This observation
entails that w and θ have to be determined for the network
under consideration; as could be expected, there are no
universally suitable values;
• we verified that the optimal choice of the design param-
eters w and θ is (β/α)-specific. This means that, when
increasing β/α, the system slowly shifts from favoring
TN to favoring TP, as desired. This is visible by observing
that for increasing values of β/α, TN shows a decreasing
trend, while TP progressively increases.
Comparing the synthetic and original data sets, we observe
that the measured detection rates are sometimes lower than
expected. In particular, we observe that there is a decrease
in performance for the original data sets with respect to the
synthetic ones. More specifically, TP in the original data set
shows just a mildly increasing trend, whereas TN decreases
considerably faster than in the synthetic case. The explanation
for this phenomenon is to be found in the distributions of
malicious and benign observation sequences, which, as we
pointed out in Section VI-B, determine the limitations to
the system performance. In the case of original traces, we
observe, compared to the synthetic case, a larger overlap of
the benign and malicious distributions, i.e., those of Xw and
Y w. We give an example of such distributions in Figure 10.
The distributions in Figure 10 are relative to the data set
Original 2 and calculated for w = 500. The consequence of
such overlapping distributions is that, despite the fact that the
chosen parameters are optimal, no better detection rates are
possible in the current setup.
Several causes are behind such a limited performance. First,
the definitions of Mw and Bw in Section V-A are such that
partially benign and partially malicious observation sequences
would lead to similar $wt values. We address this topic in
Section VIII. Second, the prototype used for our analysis,
presented in Section III, is very simple. Such a prototype was a
good starting point for describing our optimization procedure,
but several extensions would be needed before it could be
used as an IDS. Finally, such results provide us with indirect
information about the quality of the synthetic time series. In
[7], [2], we showed that our models are able to capture the
main statistical characteristics of the original data sets, with
the exception of the autocorrelation. We suspect that the higher
random component in the synthetic time series causes the
smaller overlap of the considered distributions. Improving the
autocorrelation of the synthetic traces is therefore a key topic
for future extensions.
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2) Detection and normalization lags: Tables II, III, IV
and V also report the average detection lag DA and the
average normalization lag EA and their respective standard
deviations. In calculating the detection and normalization lags,
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TABLE II: Performance measures for Synthetic 1.
Confusion matrix Detection and normalization lags
β/α wopt θopt TP TN DA std(DA) EA std(EA)
0.1 110 381.59 0.82 0.99 61.85 38.60 32.42 24.26
0.2 120 404.24 0.87 0.98 53.75 21.76 43.21 25.54
0.3 130 430.12 0.89 0.97 53.50 19.57 52.95 28.89
0.4 130 426.11 0.90 0.97 52.25 19.36 56.37 28.62
0.5 130 423.07 0.91 0.97 51.55 19.65 59.47 28.92
0.6 140 451.3 0.92 0.96 51.45 21.26 68.37 29.93
0.7 140 449.13 0.92 0.96 50.80 21.06 69.11 30.07
0.8 140 447.26 0.92 0.96 50.45 21.01 71.16 30.01
0.9 140 445.63 0.92 0.96 46.95 19.92 72.37 28.52
1 140 444.16 0.92 0.95 46.75 19.83 74.11 28.14
1.5 140 438.54 0.93 0.94 42.45 21.73 76.95 27.09
2 150 464.26 0.94 0.93 43.55 22.67 82.22 28.94
4 150 454.01 0.96 0.90 36.35 22.38 89.82 29.23
TABLE III: Performance measures for Synthetic 2.
Confusion matrix Detection and normalization lags
β/α wopt θopt TP TN DA std(DA) EA std(EA)
0.1 100 418.39 0.41 0.98 258.15 176.79 33.44 23.84
0.2 100 397.30 0.49 0.97 188.25 161.70 40.94 25.45
0.3 100 386.29 0.53 0.96 153.00 144.85 44.06 24.63
0.4 100 378.47 0.57 0.94 115.00 132.34 46.39 25.02
0.5 220 765.59 0.74 0.89 153.65 135.76 153.35 29.43
0.6 250 856.51 0.78 0.87 130.60 139.30 180.25 29.58
0.7 270 915.30 0.81 0.85 140.40 139.89 201.13 31.69
0.8 290 974.55 0.83 0.84 128.25 143.27 222.19 32.73
0.9 300 1001.75 0.85 0.83 129.20 147.28 233.75 33.22
1 320 1061.59 0.85 0.82 118.30 123.74 252.47 34.13
1.5 340 1106.62 0.88 0.77 98.90 119.67 275.93 31.01
2 350 1124.13 0.91 0.74 61.15 75.72 292.00 32.32
4 340 1055.90 0.95 0.62 38.80 72.76 297.85 32.94
we adhered to the following conventions:DA =∞ if an attack
is undetected; EA =∞ if the system does not recognize the
normal situation within a w slots from the end of the attack.
This choice was due to the fact that we are interested in the
effect the history has in recognizing that an attack is over.
DA, EA and their respective standard deviations have been
calculated only on the finite values of DA and EA.
In all considered data sets, we observe that the detection lags
decrease for increasing values of β/α, that is, if the system
favors TP. However, at the same time we also observe that, for
increasing β/α, the normalization lag tends to increase. This
situation describes well how varying the relative importance
of TN and TP does affect not only the confusion matrix, but
indirectly also how timely we are able to detect an attack or
recover from it. Note that, in Table IV, for β/α < 0.4, the
standard deviation of both the detection and the normalization
lags is undefined. This is due to the fact that, for this β/α ratio,
the system detects only one attack. In Table V, we observe that
EA and std(EA) can be undefined or ∞. For β/α < 0.6,
i.e., for ratios that favor the TN rate, the normalization lag is
equal to 0. This value, together with the low TP rate, indicates
that the tail of the attack is generally missed and flagged as
11
TABLE IV: Performance measures for Original 1.
Confusion matrix Detection and normalization lags
β/α wopt θopt TP TN DA std(DA) EA std(EA)
0.1 940 3555.26 0.06 1.00 762.00 - 56.00 -
0.2 1000 3651.20 0.06 0.99 755.00 - 149.00 -
0.3 1000 3577.90 0.06 0.99 733.00 - 182.00 -
0.4 330 1245.08 0.10 0.99 1057.00 1461.53 60.75 82.21
0.5 1000 2817.50 0.22 0.75 774.00 1379.88 560.00 409.26
0.6 1000 2808.64 0.22 0.74 773.20 1379.66 561.00 409.68
0.7 1000 2801.65 0.23 0.74 772.00 1379.05 561.75 409.84
0.8 1000 2795.88 0.23 0.74 771.40 1378.82 563.00 409.94
0.9 1000 2790.95 0.23 0.73 770.80 1378.49 565.75 410.67
1 1000 2786.64 0.23 0.73 770.60 1378.60 569.50 410.52
1.5 1000 2770.58 0.26 0.72 766.40 1380.26 573.25 411.75
2 1000 2759.21 0.28 0.72 746.20 1391.33 575.50 412.86
4 1000 2727.14 0.32 0.70 735.20 1394.97 590.75 417.67
TABLE V: Performance measures for Original 2.
Confusion matrix Detection and normalization lags
β/α wopt θopt TP TN DA std(DA) EA std(EA)
0.1 1000 3923.12 0.22 0.99 640.80 523.94 0 -
0.2 1000 3854.63 0.23 0.98 623.20 531.67 0 -
0.3 1000 3803.11 0.23 0.97 607.00 530.02 0 -
0.4 1000 3752.98 0.24 0.95 597.60 526.69 0 -
0.5 1000 3691.12 0.24 0.93 583.80 526.55 0 -
0.6 1000 3565.83 0.29 0.88 565.80 516.73 0 -
0.7 1000 3351.39 0.45 0.76 467.50 464.88 178.00 398.02
0.8 1000 3247.08 0.63 0.71 442.17 454.67 208.20 408.37
0.9 1000 3179.27 0.70 0.67 416.50 436.71 29.75 59.50
1 1000 3128.34 0.74 0.62 395.67 425.35 33.25 66.50
1.5 1000 2975.06 0.90 0.46 310.17 383.29 146.50 179.09
2 1000 2888.05 0.93 0.36 250.83 349.33 140.67 243.64
4 310 795.16 0.98 0.12 28.00 68.10 ∞ ∞
negative. For β/α = 4, i.e., for a ratio that clearly favors the
TP rate, the normalization lag rises to ∞. To understand this
result it is necessary to keep in mind that β/α describes the
relative importance of TN and TP. For such a high β/α ratio,
the trace was almost entirely flagged as positive. Therefore,
normality was never recognized within w slots after the end
of the attack, leading to EA =∞.
3) Detection rates: We investigated the detection rate per
attack. We conducted our analysis for varying β/α and consid-
ering the optimal threshold and observation sequence length,
as presented in Tables II, III, IV and V. Table VI presents the
detection rate for the four considered data sets. In the case of
the synthetic data sets Synthetic 1 and Synthetic 2, the system
correctly detects all the attacks, showing DR = 100%. This is
due to the fact that the likelihood distributions of benign and
malicious observation sequence are fairly separated, therefore
the optimal threshold always succeeds in detecting at least part
of an attack. In the case of the original data sets Original 1
and Original 2, we observe that the detection rate was not
constant, but changed with varying ratio β/α. As expected,
the detection rate increases for increasing β/α, i.e., when the
system favors the TP rate.
VIII. DISCUSSION
This section discusses the applicability of the proposed
optimization procedure and the impact of using a binary
TABLE VI: Detection rates.
DR (%)
β/α Synthetic 1 Synthetic 2 Original 1 Original 2
0.1 100 100 14 83
0.2 100 100 14 83
0.3 100 100 14 83
0.4 100 100 57 83
0.5 100 100 71 83
0.6 100 100 71 83
0.7 100 100 71 100
0.8 100 100 71 100
0.9 100 100 71 100
1.0 100 100 71 100
1.5 100 100 71 100
2.0 100 100 71 100
4.0 100 100 71 100
classifier as classification and evaluation approach underlying
our system.
A. Applicability of the proposed approach
In the introduction to Section VI, we have described an opti-
mization procedure that aims at relating the system parameters
to the metrics of interests in terms of an optimization problem.
In that form, the optimization procedure is generic and its
principles can be applied to a large spectrum of management
problems, not only to the field of intrusion detection. When
instantiating the generic procedure to a specific field, the
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challenge is to properly define the optimization problem (Step
1 in the example in Table I) and the analytical relation between
the performance measures and the system parameters (Step 2
in Table I).
In this paper, we have applied the proposed optimization
procedure to the specific problem of a flow-based, history-
based, probabilistic detection system, presented in Section III,
which we validated for SSH attacks. Many aspects of the
proposed solution can nevertheless be applied to different
contexts. Let us consider Step 1 of the procedure in Table I. In
this step, we propose an optimization problem that formalizes
the trade-off between TN and TP. Such a trade-off plays a
crucial role in virtually any detection problem; as we argued in
Section I, the number of missed anomalies and the number of
false alarms (and hence also TN and TP) are strongly correlated
measures. Therefore, this type of formalization can also be
applied to other scenarios.
In Step 2, as described in Table I, it is assumed that the
likelihoods of benign and malicious traffic can be described
as probability distributions. The precondition for Step 2 is
therefore that such probability distributions exist, or in other
words, that the system behavior is stationary. This means
that, in order to create such distributions, the system should
guarantee a certain stability of behavior, i.e., it should react
in a similar way to similar inputs over time. This condition is
satisfied for all systems for which the detection model is fixed
at training time, or for adaptive systems with a slow cycle
of retraining. It should be noted that the choice of modeling
the benign and malicious likelihood distributions as Gaussian
Mixtures is instead specific to our example. For other IDSs,
other distributions may be more suitable.
Let us now consider how the proposed procedure can
be applied to other intrusion detection methods. We have
focused our attention on a flow-based, history-based system.
Our approach could also be applied to other history-based
systems, such as the work of Qian et al. [41]. In [41], the
authors proposed an approach based on HMMs for the problem
of malicious system call sequence classification. One of the
parameters is the length of a system call sequence, which can
be considered equivalent to the parameter w in our setup.
It is emphasized, though, that our approach is not restricted
to history-based systems, since the optimization procedure
does not depend on the type of analyzed data. For example,
consider the case of a payload-based system that first assigns
to each packet a likelihood of being malicious and then
uses these values to determine when to report an attack.
Independently of which technique is used for calculating the
likelihood, the analysis of the performance results with respect
to varying the internal system parameters would lead to a
system optimization.
Finally, it should be noted that, in this paper, our running
example is the detection of SSH dictionary attacks. However,
the approach can be extended to other classes of attacks by
using a different IDS and, more importantly, by adequately
defining Step 2 of the procedure in Table I.
B. The binary classifier
In this paper, we based our detection system on a binary
classifier. Binary classifiers are a generally accepted approach
to the evaluation of IDSs, since it is generally assumed that
a traffic instance is either malicious or not. From a user
perspective, this is most likely true. However, from an IDS
perspective, the assumption does not necessary hold: there
might exist situations in which the system does not have
enough information to decide on the nature of the analyzed
traffic. For example, our system is likely to erroneously
classify observation sequences in the beginning and ending
phases of an attack, as we see in Section VII-C2, due to the
influence of the past history on the decision process. In such
cases, a binary classifier introduces errors that impact on the
overall performance of the detection system. We argue that
the overall performance of the system could be improved by
introducing in the classification process a new state, indicating
that the system is “uncertain” regarding the nature of the
analyzed traffic. In our opinion, the advantage of a third state
is twofold. First, it can help reducing the classification errors
since the detection system would classify only traffic instances
that are considered certainly benign or malicious. Second, the
state of uncertainty can also become informative for the system
manager: the degree of uncertainty on the nature of the traffic,
for example, could be presented to the system manager as an
alert level, notifying a change in the traffic behavior that could
be notice of the beginning of an attack.
Finally, it should be noted that other types of IDSs classify
traffic instances into a set of classes, corresponding to different
attack types. An example of such type could be an IDS based
on neural networks. However, such a system would not be
an anomaly-based one, since the detection model should be
trained on samples of both malicious and benign traffic. In
this sense, these systems fall outside the scope of this paper.
From the point of view of the system performance, a system
detecting several classes of attacks can still be evaluated in
terms of the classical confusion matrix, by considering only
the overall number of flagged or missed attacks. Note however,
that in this way we would not know if an attack, besides being
flagged, has also been correctly labeled.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes an autonomic approach for tuning the
parameters of anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. In
particular, our contribution is twofold. First, we highlight the
importance of tuning the parameters of an anomaly detection
system to achieve an optimal performance level. We hope
that our analysis can bring new awareness while creating
or deploying a new anomaly-based system. In the paper,
we propose to approach the parameter-tuning problem by
formalizing it in terms of an optimization procedure. The
optimization procedure allows to explicitly relate the system
parameters and the performance measures in the form of an
optimization problem. A key characteristic of the proposed
solution is that it regards optimality according to high-level
policies.
Second, in this paper we show how to apply the opti-
mization procedure to an HMM-based IDS. In this case, the
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optimization problem consists in maximizing the number of
correctly classified observation sequences. In our example, the
policy expresses the relative importance of detecting all the
attacks versus keeping the false alarm rate low. Our validation
showed that, by varying the relative importance, we are able
to fine-tune the system to favor either the detection of all
the anomalies or the detection of attacks only when they are
certain. Our findings also show that the relative importance has
impact on the detection rate and on how timely the system is
able to detect an attack or recover from it. We therefore believe
that, when expressing a usage policy in terms of the relative
importance, it should be taken into account that such a policy
affects the system performance in multiple ways. The choice
of which would be a suitable policy, is left to the system
manager.
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APPENDIX A
HIDDEN MARKOV MODELS
An HMM is a discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) where
each state is augmented with a probability distribution over a
finite set of output symbols.
With S = {s1, . . . , sn} we denote the finite set of hidden
states. S is called hidden chain. With qt we denote the state at
time t, and with aij the probability of jumping from state si to
state sj . Since we are dealing with a DTMC, this probability
only depends on the current state si, i.e.,
aij = P(qt+1 = sj | qt = si);
obviously, ∑j aij = 1. With pii we denote the probability of
the initial state being si, i.e.,
pii = P(q1 = si).
Now let K = {k1, . . . km} represent the finite set of output
symbols. With ot we denote the output symbol seen at time
t. Define by bsi(k) the probability of seeing output symbol k
when the hidden state is si, i.e.,
bsi(k) = P(ot = k | qt = si).
Given an observation sequence O = {o1, . . . ot}, we let
Q = {q1 . . . qt} be the hidden sequence that generates O. It
is important to notice that several different hidden sequences
Q may lead to the same observation sequence O. Finally, we
refer to this model using the compact notation λ = (A,B,pi).
As described in [28], HMMs allow to estimate the proba-
bility of a sequence of observation O = {o1, . . . ot}, indicated
as P(O |λ). Now P(O |λ) allows to score ‘how well a model
matches a given observation sequence’ [28]. This motivates
why this measure is interesting for anomaly detection: it indi-
cates how likely it is that a sequence of network measurements
is observed. Our assumption is that unlikely sequences denote
the presence of a network anomaly.
We can compute P(O |λ) based on both the observation
sequence O = {o1, . . . ot} and the set {Q} of all possible
hidden sequences associated to O, as follows:
P(O |λ) =
∑
{Q}
piq1bq1(o1)
t∏
i=2
aqi−1qibqi(oi). (12)
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